of the enemy, he struggles with his indisposition, rises up, and commands his servants to set fire immediately to all the timber lying between the intrenchment and the fort for the military engines, and to the engines themselves. This unexpected conflagration stopped the Syracusans, saved Nicias, the fort, and all the rich effects of the Athenians, who made haste to the relief of that general. At the same time the fleet was seen sailing into the great harbour, according to the orders given for that purpose. The Syracusans having perceived this from the hill, and fearing they should be attacked from behind, and overpowered by the land forces, they retired, and returned to the city with all their forces; now no longer expecting, after having lost their fosse lined with palisades, that it would be possible for them to prevent the enemy from carrying on their contravallation as far as the sea. In the mean time the Athenians who had contented themselves with building a single wall on the hills of Epipolæ, and through such places as were craggy and of difficult access, being come down into the plain, began to build, at the foot of the hills, a double wall, intending to carry it as far as the sea, viz. a wall of contravallation against the besieged, and another of circumvallation against those Syracusan troops which were out of the city, and such allies as might come to its aid. From thenceforth Nicias, who now was sole general, conceived great hopes; for several cities of Sicily, which hitherto had not declared for either side, came and joined him; and there arrived from all quarters vessels laden with provisions for his army, all parties being eager to go over to him, because he had acquired the superiority, and been exceedingly successful in all his undertakings. The Syracusans, seeing themselves blocked up both by sea and land, and losing all hopes of being able to defend their city any longer, already proposed an accommodation. Gylippus, who was coming from Lacedæmon to their assistance, having heard in his passage the extremity to which they were reduced, and looking upon the whole island as lost, sailed forward nevertheless; not in the view of defending Sicily, but only to preserve to the nations of Italy such cities as were subject to them in that island, if it were not too late, and if this could be done. For fame had declared in all places that the Athenians had already possessed themselves of the whole island; and were headed by a general, whose wisdom and good fortune rendered him invincible. Nicias himself, now, contrary to his natural disposition, confiding in his own strength, and elate from his success; persuaded also by the secret advices which were brought him daily from Syracuse, and the messengers who were sent to him, that the city would immediately capitulate; did not regard Gylippus' approach, and in consequence took no precautions to prevent his landing, especially when he heard that he brought but very few vessels ; terming him a trifling pirate, not worthy in any manner his notice. But a general ought to be extremely careful not to abate his cares and vigilance upon account of success, because the least negligence may ruin every thing. Had Nicias sent the smallest detachment to oppose Gylippus' landing, he would have taken Syracuse, and the whole affair had been ended. THE SYRACUSANS SECTION XIII. RESOLVE TO CAPITULATE, BUT GYLIPPUS' ARRIVAL NINETEENTH YEAR OF THE WAR. THE fortifications of the Athenians were now almost completed; * and they had drawn a double wall, near half a league in length, along the plain and the fens towards the great port, and had almost reached it. There now remained, on the side towards Trogilus, only a small part of the wall to be finished. The Syracusans were therefore on the brink of ruin, and had no hopes left, as they were no longer able to defend themselves, and did not expect any succours. For this reason they resolved to surrender. Accordingly a council was held to settle articles of capitulation, in order to present them to Nicias; and several were of opinion that it would be proper to capitulate soon, before the city should be entirely invested. It was at that very instant, and at the most critical juncture, that an officer, Gongyles by name, arrived from Corinth on board a ship with three benches of oars. At his arrival, all the citizens flocked around him. He informed them, that Gylippus would be with them immediately, and was followed by a great many other galleys, which came to their aid. The Syracusans, astonished, or rather stupefied, as it were, with this news, could scarce believe what they heard. Whilst they were thus fluctuating and in doubt, a courier arrived from Gylippus to inform them of his approach, and order them to march out all their troops to meet him. He himself, after having taken a fort (Jeges) in his way, marched in battle directly for Epipolæ ; and ascending by Euryelus, as the Athenians had done, he prepared to attack them from without, whilst the Syracusans should charge them, on their side, with the forces of Syracuse and his. The Athenians, exceedingly surprised by his arrival, drew up hastily, and without order, under the walls. With regard to himself, laying down his arms when he approached, he sent word by a herald, that he would allow the Athenians five days to leave Sicily. Nicias did not condescend to make the least answer to this proposal; and some of his soldiers bursting out a laughing, asked the herald, "Whether the presence of a Lacedæmonian "privateer, and a trifling wand, could make any change in the present state "of the city?" Both sides therefore prepared for battle. Gylippus stormed the fort of Labdalon, and cut to pieces all who were found in it. The same day an Athenian galley was taken, as it sailed into the harbour. The besieged afterwards drew a wall from the city, towards Epipolæ, in order to cut, about the extremity of it, the single wall of the Athenians; and to deprive them of all communication with the troops posted in the intrenchments which surrounded the city on the north side towards Tyche and Trogilus. The Athenians, after having finished the wall, which extended as far as the sea towards the great harbour, were returned to the hills. Gylippus perceiving, in the single wall which the Athenians had built on the hills of Epipolæ, a part that was weaker and lower than the rest, marched thither in the night with his troops; but being discovered by the Athenians, who were encamped without, he was forced to retire, upon seeing them advance directly towards him. They raised the wall A. M. 3597. Ant. J. C. 413. Thucyd. 1. vii. p. 485-489. Plut. in Nic. p. 535, 536. Diod. 1. xiii. p. 138, 139. higher, and themselves undertook the guard of it; after having fixed their allies in the several posts of the remainder of the intrenchment. Nicias, on the other side, thought proper to fortify the cape of Plemmyrium, which, by its running into the sea, straitened the mouth of the great harbour; and his design thereby was to procure provisions, and all other things he might want, the more easily; because the Athenians, by possessing themselves of that post, drew near the little port, wherein lay the chief naval forces of the Syracusans, and were the better able to observe the various motions of it; and that besides, by having the sea open, they would not be forced to have all their provisions from the bottom of the great harbour; as they must have been, should the enemy, by seizing on the mouth of it, oblige them to keep close in the harbour, in the manner they then did. For Nicias, from the arrival of Gylippus, had no hopes left but from the side next the sea. Sending therefore his fleet and part of his troops thither, he built three forts, by which the ships were enabled to lie at anchor; he also secured there a great part of the baggage and ammunition. It was then that the troops on board the fleet suffered very much; for as they were obliged to go a great way to fetch wood and water, they were surrounded by the enemy's horse, the third part of which were posted at Olympia, to prevent the garrison of Plemmyrium from sallying, and were masters of the field. Advice being brought to Nicias that the Corinthian fleet was advancing, he sent 20 galleys against it; ordering them to observe the enemy towards Locris, Rhegium, and the rest of the avenues of Sicily. In the mean time Gylippus, employing those very stones which the Athenians had got together for their use, went on with the wall which the Sy. racusans had begun to carry through Epipolæ ; and drew up daily in battle array before it, as did the Athenians. When he saw it was a proper time for engaging, he began the battle in the spot lying between the two walls. The narrowness of it having rendered his cavalry and archers useless, he came off with loss, and the Athenians set up a trophy. Gylippus, to reanimate his soldiers, by doing them justice, had the courage to reproach himself for the ill success they had met with, and to declare publicly, that he, not they, had occasioned the late defeat, because he had made them fight in too narrow a spot of ground. However, he promised soon to give them an opportunity of recovering both their honour and his; and accordingly, the very next day, he led them against the enemy, after having exhorted them, in the strongest terms, to behave in a manner worthy of their ancient glory. Nicias perceiving, that though he should not desire to come to a battle, it would however be absolutely necessary for him to prevent the enemy from extending their line beyond the contravallation, to which they were already very near; because otherwise this would be granting them a certain victory; he therefore marched against the Syracusans. Gylippus brought up his troops beyond that place where the walls terminated on both sides, in order that he might leave the more room to extend his battle; when charging the enemy's left wing with his horse, he put it to flight, and soon after defeated the right. We have here an instance of what the experience and abilities of a great captain are capable of producing for Gylippus, with the same men, the same arms, the same horses, and the same ground, by only changing his order of battle, defeated the Athenians, and beat them quite to their camp. The following night the victors carried on their wall beyond the contravallation of the Atheni ans, and thereby deprived them of all hopes of being ever able to surround them. * After this success, the Syracusans, to whose aid the Corinthian fleet was arrived unperceived by that of the Athenians, resumed courage, armed several galleys, and marching into the plains with their cavalry and other forces, took a great number of prisoners. They sent deputies to Lacedæmonia and Corinth to desire a reinforcement; Gylippus went in person to all the cities in Sicily, to solicit them to join him, and brought over the greatest part of them, who accordingly sent him powerful succours. Nicias, finding his troops lessen, and those of the enemy increase daily, began to be discouraged, and not only sent expresses to the Athenians, to acquaint them with the situation of affairs, but likewise wrote to them in the strongest terms. I repeat his whole letter, both as it gives a clear and exact account of the state of things at that time in Syracuse, and may serve as a model for such kind of relations. 66 "Athenians: I have already informed you by several expresses of what "passed here but it is necessary you should know the present situation of "affairs, that you may resolve accordingly. After we had been victorious "in several engagements, and almost completed our contravallation, Gylippus arrived in Syracuse with a body of Lacedæmonian and Sicilian "troops; and having been defeated the first time, he was victorious the se"cond, by means of his cavalry and archers. We are in consequence "shut up in our intrenchments, without daring to make any attempt, or "complete our works, through the superiority of the enemy's forces; for part of our soldiers are employed in guarding our forts, and consequent"ly we have not an opportunity of employing all our forces in battle. Be"sides, as the Syracusans have cut our lines by a wall, in that part where "they were not complete, it will no longer be possible for us to invest the "city, unless we should force their intrenchments; so that instead of besieg"ing, we ourselves are besieged, and dare not stir out for fear of their "horse. 66 "Not contented with these advantages, they are bringing new succours "from Peloponnesus, and have sent Gylippus to force all the neutral cities "of Sicily to declare for them, and the rest to furnish them with men and "ships, to attack us both by sea and land. I say by sea, which though very 66 surprising, is however but too true. For our fleet, which before was con"siderable, from the good condition of the galleys and mariners, is now very deficient in those very circumstances, and prodigiously weakened. "Our galleys leak every where; because we cannot draw them on shore "to careen them, for fear, lest those of the enemy, which are more nume"rous, and in better condition than ours, should attack us on a sudden, "which they seem to threaten every moment. Besides, we are under a "necessity of sending many backwards and forwards to guard the convoys, "which we are forced to fetch from a great distance, and bring along in "sight of the enemy; so that should we be ever so little negligent in this "point, our army would be starved. "With regard to the ships' crews, they decrease sensibly every day; "for as great numbers of them disperse to maraud, or to fetch wood and "water, they are often cut to pieces by the enemy's horse. Our slaves, "allured by the neighbourhood of the enemy's camp, desert very fast to "it. The foreigners which we forced into the service, diminish daily; "and such as have been raised with money, who came for plunder rather "than fighting, finding themselves baulked, go over to the enemy, who are so near us, or else hide themselves in Sicily, which they may easily do Thucyd. 1. vii. p. 490-494. Plut. in Nic. p. 586. Diod. 1. xiii. p. 139, 66 “in so large an island. A great number of citizens, though long used to, " and well skilled in working of ships, by bribing the captains, put others "in their room, who are wholly unexperienced, and incapable of serving, "and by that means have quite subverted all discipline. I am now writing "to men perfectly well versed in naval affairs, and who are very sensible, "that when order is neglected, every thing grows worse, and a fleet must "inevitably be ruined. "But the most unhappy circumstance is, that though I am generalissi"mo, I cannot put a stop to these disorders. For, Athenians, you are very "sensible, that such is your disposition that you do not easily brook re"straint; besides, I do not know where to furnish myself with seamen, "whilst the enemy get numbers from all quarters. It is not in the power "of our Sicilian allies to aid us; and should the cities of Italy, from "whence we have our provisions, hearing the extremity to which we are "reduced, and your not taking the least care to send us any succour, join "the Syracusans, we are undone; and the enemy will have no occasion "to fight us. 66 66 "I could write of things which would be more agreeable, but of none "that could be more advantageous to you, nor which could give you a more just idea of the subjects on which you are to deliberate. I am "sensible that you love to have such advices only sent you as are pleasing; but then I know, on the other side, that when affairs turn out oth❝erwise than you expected and hoped for, you accuse those who deceived ። you, which induced me to give you a sincere and genuine account of things, without concealing a single circumstance. By the way, I am "to inform you, that no complaints can be justly made either against the "officers or common soldiers, both having done their duty very well. 66 tr "But now that the Sicilians join all their forces against us, and expect a new army from Peloponnesus, you may lay this down as the foundation "for your deliberation, that our present troops are not sufficient; and "therefore we either must be recalled, or else a land and naval force equal "to the first must be sent us, with money in proportion. You must also “think of appointing a person to succeed me, it being impossible for me, "through my nephritic disorder, to sustain any longer the weight of the "command. I imagine that I deserve this favour at your hands, on ac"count of the services I have done you in the several commands confer"red upon me, so long as iny health would permit me to act. "To conclude, whatever resolution you may come to, the request I "have to make is, that you would execute it speedily, and in the very be"ginning of the spring. The succours which our enemies meet with in Sicily are all ready; but those which they expect from Peloponnesus "may be longer in coming. However, fix this in your minds, that if you "do not exert yourselves, the Lacedæmonians will not fail, as they have "already done, to be beforehand with you." The Athenians were strongly affected with this letter, which made as great an impression on them as Nicias expected. However, they did not think proper to appoint him a successor, and only nominated two officers who were under him, viz. Meander, and Euthydemus, to assist him till other generals should be sent. Eurymedon and Demosthenes were chosen to succeed Lamachus and Alcibiades. The former set out immediately with ten galleys and some money,* about the winter solstice, to assure Nicias that a speedy succour should be sent him, during which the latter *120 talents. |