much to be pitied. What must be their feelings under such a conflict, when they are deserted by human reason! What an effect will not such religious doubts and perplexities have upon their health! What impediments do they not throw in the way of their own utility!

I should be sorry, if by any observations, such as the preceding, I should be thought to censure any one for the morality of his feelings. And still more sorry should I be, if I were to be thought to have any intention of derogating from the character of the Supreme Being. I am far from denying his omniscience; for I believe that he sees every sparrow that falls to the ground, and even more, that he knows the innermost thoughts of men. I deny not his omnipresence; for I believe that he may be seen in all his works. I deny neither his general nor his particular providence, nor his hearing of our prayers, nor his right direction in our spiritual concerns, nor his making all things work together for good to those, who love him. Neither do I refuse to admit him either into our journeys, or into our walks, or

into

into our chambers; for he can make all the things we see subservient to our moral instruction, and his own glory. But I should be sorry to have him considered as a clock, that is to inform us about the times of our ordinary movements; or to make him a prompter in all our worldly concerns; or to oblige him to take his seat in animal-magnetism; or to reside in the midst of marvellous delusions. Why should we expect a revelation in the most trivial concerns in our lives, where our reason will inform us? Why, like the waggoner, apply to Hercules, when we may remove the difficulty by putting our own shoulders to the wheels? If we are reasonable creatures, we can generally tell, whether we ought to go forwards or backwards, or to begin or to postpone; whether our actions are likely to be innocent or hurtful, or whether we are going on an errand of benevolence or of evil. In fact, there can be no necessity for this cónstant appeal to the Spirit in * all our worldly

concerns,

* I hope the reader will consider me as confining my observations on this subject to trivial things. I by no means intend to say, that we ought never to ask help or

directions

concerns, while we possess our reason as men. And unless some distinction be made between the real agency of God and our own volitions, which distinction true Quakerism suggests, we shall be liable to be tossed to and fro by every wind that blows, and to become the creatures of a superstition, that may lead us into great public evils, while it may be injurious to our health and intellect, and to the happiness and utility of our lives.

directions of the Almighty, or that when we put our shoulders to the wheel, we should not look up to Him for a blessing on our exertions.

CHAP

CHAPTER XII.

Morally defective traits-First of these is that of Obstinacy-this was attached also to the early Christians-No just foundation for the existence of this trait.

I

COME now to the consideration of those, which I have denominated Morally Defective Traits.

The first of this kind, which is attached to the character of the Quakers, is that of of an obstinate spirit.

It was

This trait is a very antient one. observed, in the time of George Fox, of the members of this Society, that they were as "stiff as trees;" and this idea concerning them has come down to the present day.

The origin of this defective feature must be obvious to all. The Quakers, as we have seen, will neither pay tithes, nor perform military service, nor illuminate their houses, like other people, though they are sure of suffering by their refusal to comply with custom in these cases. Now when individuals, few in number, become singular, and

differ from the world at large, it is generally considered that the majority are in the right, and that the minority are in the wrong, But obstinacy may be defined to be a perseverance in that, which is generally considered to be wrong.

This epithet has attached, and will attach, to those, who resist the popular opinion, till men are better educated, or till they lose their prejudices, or have more correct and liberal notions on religion. The early Christians were themselves accused of obstinacy, and this even by the enlightened Pliny. He tells us, that they would not use wine and frankincense before the statues of the emperors, and that "there was no question that for such obstinacy they deserved punishment*."

In judging of the truth of this trait, two questions will arise: First, Whether the members of this Society, in adhering rigidly to those singularities, which have produced it, are really wrong as a body of Christians? and, secondly, Whether they do not conscientiously believe themselves to be right?

"Pervicaciam certè et inflexibilem obstinationem debere puniri."