they may be but as one to a hundred-thousand when compared with the perfect things of their own kind, so such phænomena may occasionally make their appearance in the world. But, as far as my own experience and observation extend, I believe the true tendency of learning to be quite the reverse. I believe the most learned to be generally the most humble, and to be the most sensible of their own ignorance. Men in the course of their studies daily find something new. Every thing new shows them only their former ignorance, and how much there is yet to learn. The more they persevere in their researches, the more they acknowledge the latter fact. The longer they live, the more they lament the shortness of life, during which, man with all his industry can attain so little; and that, when he is but just beginning to know, he is cut off. They see, in short, their own nothingness; and, however they may be superior in their attainments, they are convinced that their knowledge is, after all, but a shadow ;-that it is but darkness;-that it is but the absence of light;-and that it no sooner begins to assume an appearance, than it is 2C2 gone. The The last general argument against learning is, that it does not lead to morality, or that learned men do not always exhibit an example of the best character. In answer to this I must observe, that the natural tendency of learning is to virtue. If learned men are not virtuous, I presume their conduct is an exception to the general effect of knowledge upon the mind. That there are, however, persons of such unnatural character I must confess. But any deficiency in their example is not to be attributed to their learning. It is to be set down, on the other hand, to the morally defective education they have received. They have not been accustomed to wise restraints. More pains have been taken to give them knowledge, than to instruct them in religion. But where an education has been bestowed upon persons, in which their morals have been duly attended to, where has knowledge been found to be at variance, or, rather, where has it not been found to be in union with virtue? Of this union the Quakers can trace some of the brightest examples in their own Society. Where did knowledge, for instance, separate herself from religion in Barclay, Barclay, or in Penn, or in Burroughs, or in Pennington, or in Ellwood, or in Arscott, or in Claridge, or in many others, who might be named? And as this has been the case in the Quaker-Society, where a due care has been taken of morals, so it has been the case where a similar care has been manifested in the great society of the world. "Piety has found Friends in the friends of science, and true pray'r And in his Word sagacious. Such, too, thine, Cowper. It appears, then, if I have reasoned properly, that the arguments usually adduced against the acquisition of human knowledge are but of little weight. If I have reasoned falsely upon this subject, so have the early Quakers. As the most eminent among them were friends to virtue, so they were were friends to science. If they have at any time put a low estimate upon the latter, it has been only as a qualification for a minister of the Gospel. Here they have made a stand. Here they have made a discrimination. But I believe it will no where be found that they have denied either that learning might contribute to the innocent pleasures of life, or that it might be made a subordinate and auxiliary instrument in the promotion of virtue. CHAP Conclusion of the work-conclusory remarks divided into two kinds-first as they relate to those, who may have had thoughts of leaving the Society-advantages which these may have proposed to themselves by such a change-these advantages either religious or temporal—the value of them considered. HAVING AVING now gone through all the subjects, which I had prescribed to myself at the beginning of this work, I purpose to close it. But as it should be the wish of every author to render his production as useful as he can, I shall add a few observations for this purpose. My remarks then, which will be thus conclusory, will relate to two different sorts of persons. They will relate first to those, who may have had thoughts of leaving the Society, or, which is the same thing, who persist in a course of irregularities, knowing before-hand, and not regretting it, that they shall be eventually disowned. It will relate, secondly, to all other persons, or to those, who may be called the world. To the former |