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versal assent;" while, in regard to other nations, may we not in those of St. Albin, say of the French Civil Code, as of the Tricolor, under which it was inaugurated, "that it will make the tour of the universe," and annihilate the feudal institutions of entail and primogeniture which yet infest Britain and some other countries? If the memorable prophetic words of Lamartine, spoken as Minister of Foreign Affairs, have received so striking a confirmation in the course of one short month, by the spectacle of all the German despotisms having been shaken to their centre, what ulterior effects may not be confidently anticipated? "If such things have been done in the green tree, what will not be done in the dry?" "Jam novus nascitur ordo." A new era dawns upon Europe, and its oppressed or misgoverned people. "C'est trop tard," are words which the British aristocracy should remember and ponder over.

THE TRANSLATOR.

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE INFLUENCE OF THE INSTITUTIONS DESTINED TO PERPETUATE THE ESTATES OF THE ARISTOCRACY, ON THE COMPOSITION OF SOCIETY.

THERE exist betwixt the different parts of which society is made up, relations so intimate and direct, that in the chapters destined to treat of the influence which the privileges of property exercise on each of them, it is almost impossible to separate clearly the considerations which severally attach to them. How, for example, can we speak of the effects of the distribution of wealth on the amount of the population, without recalling some of the effects of that same distribution on industry? How can we treat of industry, without entering upon the moral causes the influence of which it feels so strongly? Thus do I aim less at

introducing strict order into the views which I am about to present, than to expose them with all necessary extension and clearness.

Let us begin, by examining the influence of a factitious inequality in the matter of riches, on the composition of society; that is to say, on the classification which it establishes.

We have seen, in the preceding chapter, how, in adjudging to the privileged minority the totality, or only a portion of the social patrimony, the institutions of the nobility increase the power of the tendencies favourable to an inequality of fortunes; the more these institutions narrow the number of the rich, the more they augment that of the poor; and thence come the consequences which will enable us, in our examination, to appreciate the connexion subsisting betwixt proprietors and the rest of the community.

In every country, whoever possesses neither lands, capital, nor other means of existence than his manual labour, necessarily lives by the hire which he receives from the rich. Thus, on the one side, there is a tender of services, and, on the other, an acceptation of them at a rate constantly regulated by the general supply and demand. If more day-labourers present themselves than the rich have occasion for, they only who ask least are employed; if there be fewer, the wages rise; but in every case, the unpropertied labourers being under the absolute necessity of working, while the rich have only an interest to furnish them with work, such a disparity in the situations of the contracting parties always throws into the balance a weight unfavourable to the starving operative.

Amongst the causes, whose influence is felt, in fixing

the rate of wages, there is none more active than the relation of the numbers of the two classes. Suppose, for example, that the same individual possesses at once, the lands and manufactories, in a word, all the productive means, of a country; on him solely would depend the lot of the whole population. It is to him that they would apply to obtain work; and as, unless in exceptional cases, he would be inclined to give the lowest wages possible, it is evident that, compelled by the necessity of bending to the law which he might choose to impose, they would see themselves reduced to wages barely necessary for preserving themselves alive.

Suppose that the same productive funds fall into the hands of several, the people would be great gainers by the fact. For, independently of the advantages of having a choice of masters, wages would rise through the competition of employers; and the number of the latter becoming greater, the rewards of labour would increase in the same proportion.

Such are the consequences of the relations of numbers, which keep the distribution of wealth more or less unequal among the different portions of the community. To the material effects of competition, are still joined the moral circumstances, whose influence extends and fortifies them. Are some individuals in the enjoyment of an exclusive opulence? they display little ardour in its increase; and, content with a prosperous condition, they hold out little encouragement to an industry of which they alone possess the elements. Are the masters, on the contrary, less rich and more numerous? the moderateness of their fortunes awakens the desire of increasing them; industry becomes brisk; the hope of gain causes higher wages to be given to the working

classes, whose labour becoming a subject of competition, a rise of wages soon places them in an easy and happy position.

We therefore see, that from the concentration, more or less marked, of fortunes, result both the composition of the social body, and the degree of comfort which the masses enjoy. A few rich, and many poor, behold the fruit of privilege. All that is heaped on the small number being taken from the masses, tends to retain them under the yoke of misery and ignorance; and, as we will shew in the sequel, raises up powerful obstacles to their advancement in well-being and prosperity.

CHAPTER V.

ON THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRIVILEGES OF PROPERTY ON THE AMOUNT OF THE POPULATION.

THAT a distribution of wealth, more or less unequal, has an influence on the amount of the population, is a truth that no enlightened publicist has ever called in question.

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Suppose," says Storch, "that the industry of a country furnishes the means of subsistence for twenty millions of inhabitants: if fortunes are there too unequally divided, a small number will consume an amount of produce which would suffice for nourishing a multitude, and consequently, the population will stop short at twelve millions, in place of rising to twenty, as it would do if wealth were better distributed."

Such is actually the consequence of a too unequal division of wealth. Whatever may be the state of the

arts, industry, or the productive powers of society, it being impossible to deprive the rich of the right of sacrificing in idle pleasures, the incomes capable of furnishing the means of subsistence to numerous families, to prevent them from preserving in gardens, walks, and parks, lands fit for cultivation-from keeping packs of hounds, horses, racing establishments, and supporting a great retinue of useless and lazy menials— in a word, from absorbing in superfluities, in the enjoyment of luxury and caprice, a part of their wealth,—the population remains depressed in the exact ratio that the institutions advantage the minority.

There exists in Hungary a domain, which the princes of the house of Esterhazy have devoted to the pleasures of the chase. A lake of great extent preserves the waterfowl; thick forests furnish shelter for deer and wild boars; and a vast plain, left uncultivated, is set apart for pheasants and partridges. "Ah, were I the owner of that regal residence," said the Prince de Ligne, soon would there rise up on the banks of the lake a handsome village; the plain would soon be covered with farms and hamlets; and with what delight would I not listen to the joyous hum of the numerous inhabitants whom the place would nourish !"

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Here is a striking picture of the consequences of overgrown opulence: to the pleasures of one are sacrificed the means of existence and the happiness of many thousand individuals. If there were some hundred Princes de Esterhazy in Austria, never assuredly would have risen up in its provinces that dense population, whose arms now fertilize and defend them.

It is useless to dwell long on a point so easy to form an opinion upon. Two causes determine the multipli

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