The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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... chapters call for a rudimentary acquaintance with some concepts from game theory . The first chapter ( in a longer version ) was originally presented in early 1959 to a conference on " International Relations in the Mid - twentieth ...
... chapters call for a rudimentary acquaintance with some concepts from game theory . The first chapter ( in a longer version ) was originally presented in early 1959 to a conference on " International Relations in the Mid - twentieth ...
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... Chapter 2 appeared with the same title in The American Economic Review , Vol . XLVI No. 3 , June 1956. Chapter 3 appeared with the same title in The Journal of Conflict Resolution , Vol . I No. 1 , March 1957 . Chapters 4 , 5 , and 6 ...
... Chapter 2 appeared with the same title in The American Economic Review , Vol . XLVI No. 3 , June 1956. Chapter 3 appeared with the same title in The Journal of Conflict Resolution , Vol . I No. 1 , March 1957 . Chapters 4 , 5 , and 6 ...
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... Chapter 10 , this conclusion is not so strange if we recognize the " balance of terror " as simply a massive modern version of an ancient institution , the exchange of hostages . Here perhaps we perceive a disadvantage peculiar to ...
... Chapter 10 , this conclusion is not so strange if we recognize the " balance of terror " as simply a massive modern version of an ancient institution , the exchange of hostages . Here perhaps we perceive a disadvantage peculiar to ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game