The Strategy of Conflict
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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But, if commitment means the attachment of a finite penalty to the choice of row ii
and we show this in the matrix by subtracting from each of Row's ... Otherwise it is
clear to Column that Row's response to II will be ii, in spite of the commitment.
15 C.) Can we now build up a larger matrix that represents not only the actual
choices of rows and columns in the ... Take the simple game in which Row has
the power to commit himself visibly in advance, and Column has first move in the
For Row, a strategy consists of a decision on o, I, or 2, plus a pair of symbols
denoting how he will react to each of Column's possible ... For example, 1 ; I-i, II-i
would mean, “Commit to row 1, then choose row I no matter what Column does.
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY
Game Theory and Experimental Research
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