The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 74
... action that everyone can be sure that everyone else reads the same signal with enough confidence to act on it , thus providing one another with the immunity that goes with action in large numbers . ( There is even the possibility that ...
... action that everyone can be sure that everyone else reads the same signal with enough confidence to act on it , thus providing one another with the immunity that goes with action in large numbers . ( There is even the possibility that ...
Page 86
... action depends on the action he expects the other to take , which he knows depends , in turn , on the other's expectations of his own . This interdependence of expecta , tions is precisely what distinguishes a game of strategy from a ...
... action depends on the action he expects the other to take , which he knows depends , in turn , on the other's expectations of his own . This interdependence of expecta , tions is precisely what distinguishes a game of strategy from a ...
Page 191
... action that initiates an irreversible process , is not something that should necessarily be expected to be taken al ... action has gotten up too much momentum to stop , or his actions are being carried out by puppets or satellites that ...
... action that initiates an irreversible process , is not something that should necessarily be expected to be taken al ... action has gotten up too much momentum to stop , or his actions are being carried out by puppets or satellites that ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game