The Strategy of Conflict
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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... an explicit theory of “rational” decision, and of the strategic consequences of
such decisions, makes perfectly clear that it is not a universal advantage in
situations of conflict to be inalienably and manifestly rational in decision and
(Paradoxically, the United States could not give the Japanese the benefit of this
bargaining gimmick unless the United States were patently motivated to take
advantage of its claim if the tactic failed.) * “STRATEGIC MOVES” If the essence
of a ...
So there may be advantages in thinking of the surpriseattack problem as one
suitable for negotiation. ... It must assume that if the advantage of striking first can
be eliminated or severely reduced, the incentive to strike at all will be reduced.
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY
Game Theory and Experimental Research
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