The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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... adversaries' is connected to the changing form of war in which 'adversaries neither think nor act like nation-states'. The language of 'Adversary' rather than 'Enemy' has been reinforced by others who stress the cultural aspects of war ...
... adversaries' is connected to the changing form of war in which 'adversaries neither think nor act like nation-states'. The language of 'Adversary' rather than 'Enemy' has been reinforced by others who stress the cultural aspects of war ...
Page 15
... adversary. A state that faces an opportunistic adversary must hedge against the possibility that this adver- sary will act on contingent plans to expand. A state may thus pursue coercive diplomacy against this type of adversary ...
... adversary. A state that faces an opportunistic adversary must hedge against the possibility that this adver- sary will act on contingent plans to expand. A state may thus pursue coercive diplomacy against this type of adversary ...
Page 94
... adversary , the Devil , can afford to live in a lighthearted or flippant way . But for one who sees life as Jesus Christ sees it , there must be an entirely new attitude , an entirely new outlook characterized by sobriety . But in ...
... adversary , the Devil , can afford to live in a lighthearted or flippant way . But for one who sees life as Jesus Christ sees it , there must be an entirely new attitude , an entirely new outlook characterized by sobriety . But in ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game