The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 44
... agreement to stay out of each other's market may require an agreement to redesign the products to be unsuitable in each other's area . Two countries that wish to agree not to make military use of an island may have to destroy the ...
... agreement to stay out of each other's market may require an agreement to redesign the products to be unsuitable in each other's area . Two countries that wish to agree not to make military use of an island may have to destroy the ...
Page 62
... agreement on shares of this total , they may share the an- nual tax bill in whatever manner they agree on . But they must reach agreement without communication ; each is to write down the share he proposes to pay , and if the shares ...
... agreement on shares of this total , they may share the an- nual tax bill in whatever manner they agree on . But they must reach agreement without communication ; each is to write down the share he proposes to pay , and if the shares ...
Page 272
... agreement.9 - It should be emphasized that bargaining - game solutions that ( like the Nash and Harsanyi solutions ) depend on a clearly recognized zero point— that is , on an unambiguous outcome that reigns in the absence of overt agree ...
... agreement.9 - It should be emphasized that bargaining - game solutions that ( like the Nash and Harsanyi solutions ) depend on a clearly recognized zero point— that is , on an unambiguous outcome that reigns in the absence of overt agree ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game