The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 75
... alternatives and cannot simply be a matter of degree ; ( 2 ) when agreement must be reached with incomplete communication ... alternative agreement concerning poison gas could have been arrived at without formal communi- cation ( or even ...
... alternatives and cannot simply be a matter of degree ; ( 2 ) when agreement must be reached with incomplete communication ... alternative agreement concerning poison gas could have been arrived at without formal communi- cation ( or even ...
Page 259
... alternative , since both sides have an interest in finding some limit . The border has a uniqueness that makes it a plausible limit . It is one of the few lines - perhaps the only line , but certainly one of the few that one could draw ...
... alternative , since both sides have an interest in finding some limit . The border has a uniqueness that makes it a plausible limit . It is one of the few lines - perhaps the only line , but certainly one of the few that one could draw ...
Page 284
... alternatives are available . That there are other means of concerting , including some that may substantially outweigh the notion of ... alternative is vacuum . metry does provide the focus for coordinated expectations , and 284 APPENDIX B.
... alternatives are available . That there are other means of concerting , including some that may substantially outweigh the notion of ... alternative is vacuum . metry does provide the focus for coordinated expectations , and 284 APPENDIX B.
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game