The Strategy of Conflict
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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But these extreme possibilivoko to owed -a wo o, too assume a promise. If the
law will not enforce price agreements; or if the union is unable to obligate itself to
a no-strike pledge; or if a contractor has no assets to pay damages if he loses a ...
(There may also be some limits or sanctuary concepts that we take for granted
that should be reexamined to see whether they were originally by-products of the
assumed nuclear ban and might disappear with it. We may want to look again at
This game offers, in effect, three strategies to a player, namely, (1) assume the
other will wait, and demand 99 per cent; (2) assume both will make simultaneous
offers, and demand whatever is indicated by the tacit game; (3) wait. If both wait ...
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY
Game Theory and Experimental Research
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