The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 137
... balance of terror " that is so often adverted to is- if , in fact , it exists and is stable equivalent to a total exchange of all conceivable hostages . ( The analogy requires that the balance be stable , i.e. , that neither side be ...
... balance of terror " that is so often adverted to is- if , in fact , it exists and is stable equivalent to a total exchange of all conceivable hostages . ( The analogy requires that the balance be stable , i.e. , that neither side be ...
Page 232
... balance of terror in which either side can obliterate the other and one in which both sides can do it no matter who strikes first . It is not the " balance " the sheer equality or symmetry in the situation that constitutes mutual ...
... balance of terror in which either side can obliterate the other and one in which both sides can do it no matter who strikes first . It is not the " balance " the sheer equality or symmetry in the situation that constitutes mutual ...
Page 239
... balance of terror , " if it is stable , is simply a mas- sive and modern version of an ancient institution : the exchange of hostages . In older times , one committed himself to a promise by delivering his hostages physically into the ...
... balance of terror , " if it is stable , is simply a mas- sive and modern version of an ancient institution : the exchange of hostages . In older times , one committed himself to a promise by delivering his hostages physically into the ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game