The Strategy of Conflict
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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He cannot usefully threaten nonperformance, since A has no incentive to carry
out either project by himself. But if B can link the projects together, offering to
carry out one while A carries out the other, and can effectively threaten to
centive to carry it out either before the event or after. He does have an incentive
to bind himself to fulfill the threat, if he thinks the threat may be successful,
because the threat and not its fulfillment gains the end; and fulfillment is not
required if ...
It may, for example, have to put a penalty on the carrying of weapons rather than
their use; on suspicious behavior rather ... never so large as to leave the recipient
helpless nor to provoke a diplomatic breach, the willingness to carry it out will ...
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY
Game Theory and Experimental Research
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