The Strategy of Conflict
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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I. A and B are to choose “heads” or “tails” without communicating. If both choose “
heads,” A gets $3 and B gets $2; if both choose “tails,” A gets $2 and B gets $3. If
they choose differently, neither gets anything. You are A (or B); which do you ...
But the issue is both simpler and more precise than that. Consider the left-hand
matrix in Fig. 9, where Column is assumed to have “first move.” Without threats,
Column has an easy “win.” He chooses strategy I, forcing Row to choose
Let Row now threaten to choose ii with probability equal to r, in the event Column
chooses II. In other words, if Column fails to comply there is a probability of r that
Row will choose ii to their mutual discomfort, and of (1 — tr) that he will choose i ...
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY
Game Theory and Experimental Research
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