The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 169
... cooperative " and an " uncooperative " choice . Those who played un- cooperatively against a cooperative partner had an opportunity , on the second play , to respond to the implicit offer of cooperation . But , " when their expecta ...
... cooperative " and an " uncooperative " choice . Those who played un- cooperatively against a cooperative partner had an opportunity , on the second play , to respond to the implicit offer of cooperation . But , " when their expecta ...
Page 271
... cooperative game . At this point it looks as though the cooperative feature of the game is irrelevant . The players really need not show up until 11:59 ; in fact they do not need to show up at all . The preplay communication and ability ...
... cooperative game . At this point it looks as though the cooperative feature of the game is irrelevant . The players really need not show up until 11:59 ; in fact they do not need to show up at all . The preplay communication and ability ...
Page 272
... cooperative game that might have seemed to be innocuous from the point of view of explicit negotiation may affect the character of the tacit game ; similarly , preplay com- munication that has no binding effect on the players themselves ...
... cooperative game that might have seemed to be innocuous from the point of view of explicit negotiation may affect the character of the tacit game ; similarly , preplay com- munication that has no binding effect on the players themselves ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game