The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 271
... game . And each player knows this . The most informative way to characterize the game , then , is not that the ... cooperative game must be identical with that of the corresponding tacit game ( if the latter has a predictable and ...
... game . And each player knows this . The most informative way to characterize the game , then , is not that the ... cooperative game must be identical with that of the corresponding tacit game ( if the latter has a predictable and ...
Page 272
... game . For an example , consider the following variant of the cooperative game . Instead of saying that the players may divide a set of rewards if they can reach agreement on an exhaustive division , let us say that the players may ...
... game . For an example , consider the following variant of the cooperative game . Instead of saying that the players may divide a set of rewards if they can reach agreement on an exhaustive division , let us say that the players may ...
Page 276
... cooperative game seems a little like that foot race . Bargaining in the one case is as unavail- ing as leg - work in the other ; every player knows in advance that all moves and tactics are foredoomed to neutralization by the ...
... cooperative game seems a little like that foot race . Bargaining in the one case is as unavail- ing as leg - work in the other ; every player knows in advance that all moves and tactics are foredoomed to neutralization by the ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game