The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 85
... game of pure coordination ; if pursuit epitomizes the zero - sum game , rendezvous may do the same for the coordina- tion game . co An experiment of O. K. Moore and M. I. Berkowitz provides a nice mixture in which the two limiting cases ...
... game of pure coordination ; if pursuit epitomizes the zero - sum game , rendezvous may do the same for the coordina- tion game . co An experiment of O. K. Moore and M. I. Berkowitz provides a nice mixture in which the two limiting cases ...
Page 86
... coordination isolates the essential feature of the corresponding nonzero - sum game . So we do have , in this coordinated problem - solving , with its de- pendence on the conveyance and perception of intentions or plans , a phenomenon ...
... coordination isolates the essential feature of the corresponding nonzero - sum game . So we do have , in this coordinated problem - solving , with its de- pendence on the conveyance and perception of intentions or plans , a phenomenon ...
Page 100
... coordination ; each player can win only if he does exactly what the other ... game . The game is nowhere near so " infinitely " difficult as the infinity of possible division ... games generally , since many 100 A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY.
... coordination ; each player can win only if he does exactly what the other ... game . The game is nowhere near so " infinitely " difficult as the infinity of possible division ... games generally , since many 100 A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY.
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game