The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 25
... cost , " not a " real cost " ; and if all interested parties can be brought into the negotiation the range of inde- terminacy remains as it was . But if the third party were available only at substantial transportation cost , to that ...
... cost , " not a " real cost " ; and if all interested parties can be brought into the negotiation the range of inde- terminacy remains as it was . But if the third party were available only at substantial transportation cost , to that ...
Page 32
... cost of three , and each with a value of two to A and a value of four to B , and each is in- herently a " one - man " project in its execution , and if compensa- tion is institutionally impossible , B will be forced to pay the entire cost ...
... cost of three , and each with a value of two to A and a value of four to B , and each is in- herently a " one - man " project in its execution , and if compensa- tion is institutionally impossible , B will be forced to pay the entire cost ...
Page 215
... cost " of erroneously attacking ; the denominator is the " cost " of erroneously failing to attack . The criterion is the same , it may be noted , as if P and ( 1 - P ) were sure probabilities rather than probabilities of departure from ...
... cost " of erroneously attacking ; the denominator is the " cost " of erroneously failing to attack . The criterion is the same , it may be noted , as if P and ( 1 - P ) were sure probabilities rather than probabilities of departure from ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game