The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 163
... decision process either introspectively or by an axio- matic method . There is no way to build a model for the inter- action of two or more decision units , with the behavior and ex- pectations of those decision units being derived by ...
... decision process either introspectively or by an axio- matic method . There is no way to build a model for the inter- action of two or more decision units , with the behavior and ex- pectations of those decision units being derived by ...
Page 201
... DECISION Underlying this threat that one " may " retaliate or precipitate war the decision being somewhat beyond his control - is the notion that some of the most momentous decisions of government are taken by a process that is not ...
... DECISION Underlying this threat that one " may " retaliate or precipitate war the decision being somewhat beyond his control - is the notion that some of the most momentous decisions of government are taken by a process that is not ...
Page 219
... decision , and not with a rule for decision that is , not with a model in which the player calcu- lates his best strategy and follows it - can we get the kind of " mutual aggravation " phenomenon that I described at the begin- ning of ...
... decision , and not with a rule for decision that is , not with a model in which the player calcu- lates his best strategy and follows it - can we get the kind of " mutual aggravation " phenomenon that I described at the begin- ning of ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game