The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 57
... depend on imagination more than on logic ; it may depend on analogy , precedent , accidental arrangement , symmetry , aesthetic or geo- metric ... depends on time and place and who the BARGAINING , COMMUNICATION , LIMITED WAR 57.
... depend on imagination more than on logic ; it may depend on analogy , precedent , accidental arrangement , symmetry , aesthetic or geo- metric ... depends on time and place and who the BARGAINING , COMMUNICATION , LIMITED WAR 57.
Page 78
... depends and the Russians know that it depends on how likely we consider it that such retaliation could itself remain limited . That is , it depends on how likely it is in our judgment that 78 ELEMENTS OF A THEORY OF STRATEGY.
... depends and the Russians know that it depends on how likely we consider it that such retaliation could itself remain limited . That is , it depends on how likely it is in our judgment that 78 ELEMENTS OF A THEORY OF STRATEGY.
Page 146
... depends on coordination , the timely de- struction of communication may be a winning tactic . When a man and his wife are arguing by telephone over where to meet for dinner , the argument is won by the wife if she simply an- nounces ...
... depends on coordination , the timely de- struction of communication may be a winning tactic . When a man and his wife are arguing by telephone over where to meet for dinner , the argument is won by the wife if she simply an- nounces ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game