The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 72
... evidence for the latter view . The evidence is simply that if they had to divide the $ 100 without communicating , they could concert on 50-50 . Instead of relying on intuition , then , we can point to the fact that in a slightly ...
... evidence for the latter view . The evidence is simply that if they had to divide the $ 100 without communicating , they could concert on 50-50 . Instead of relying on intuition , then , we can point to the fact that in a slightly ...
Page 124
... evidence for the assertion that one would have , ex post , incentive for doing as one warns he will . As a matter of fact , if a threat is of such nature ( as it often is ) that the act of commitment is not contained in the act of ...
... evidence for the assertion that one would have , ex post , incentive for doing as one warns he will . As a matter of fact , if a threat is of such nature ( as it often is ) that the act of commitment is not contained in the act of ...
Page 133
... evidence , so that if the body is found he will be charged with the murder . He should have insisted , however , on fabricating the evidence so as to share the guilt with the actual murderer ; as it was , he got badly cheated . ( Short ...
... evidence , so that if the body is found he will be charged with the murder . He should have insisted , however , on fabricating the evidence so as to share the guilt with the actual murderer ; as it was , he got badly cheated . ( Short ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game