The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 71
... expectations is analogous to the " coordination " of behavior when communication is cut off ; and , in fact , they both involve nothing more nor less than in- tuitively perceived mutual expectations . Thus the empirically verifiable ...
... expectations is analogous to the " coordination " of behavior when communication is cut off ; and , in fact , they both involve nothing more nor less than in- tuitively perceived mutual expectations . Thus the empirically verifiable ...
Page 92
... expectations - everyone's expectation of what everyone expects of everyone with the new arrivals ' expectations being molded in time to help mold the expectations of subsequent arrivals . There is a sense of " social contract , " the ...
... expectations - everyone's expectation of what everyone expects of everyone with the new arrivals ' expectations being molded in time to help mold the expectations of subsequent arrivals . There is a sense of " social contract , " the ...
Page 281
... expectation of a particular outcome , and that outcome is not symmetrical in a mathematical sense , can we demonstrate that their expectations are irrational , and that the rationality postulate is contradicted ? Specifically , suppose ...
... expectation of a particular outcome , and that outcome is not symmetrical in a mathematical sense , can we demonstrate that their expectations are irrational , and that the rationality postulate is contradicted ? Specifically , suppose ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game