The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 60
... expect him to . The choices that cannot coordinate expectations are not ... expected to do . The need for agreement overrules the potential disagreement ... value of $ 1.25 apiece - less than either $ 3 or $ 2 . ) 2. You and your two ...
... expect him to . The choices that cannot coordinate expectations are not ... expected to do . The need for agreement overrules the potential disagreement ... value of $ 1.25 apiece - less than either $ 3 or $ 2 . ) 2. You and your two ...
Page 215
... value obtained by unilateral surprise attack , -h the value obtained by being attacked while not attacking , o the ... expected value to be achieved through unilateral attack is only Qh . If Qh is less than 1 , we are back to a matrix ...
... value obtained by unilateral surprise attack , -h the value obtained by being attacked while not attacking , o the ... expected value to be achieved through unilateral attack is only Qh . If Qh is less than 1 , we are back to a matrix ...
Page 222
... expected value of the game for him . Letting V , denote the ex- pected value of the game for R , the warning - system problem for R is to choose the pair of values for R and B , consistent with B = f ( R ) , that maximizes 11 V1 = ( 1 ...
... expected value of the game for him . Letting V , denote the ex- pected value of the game for R , the warning - system problem for R is to choose the pair of values for R and B , consistent with B = f ( R ) , that maximizes 11 V1 = ( 1 ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game