The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 124
... fact that some kind of commitment , or at least appearance of commitment , must lie behind the threat and be successfully communicated to the threatened party is in contradiction to an- other notion that often appears in game theory ...
... fact that some kind of commitment , or at least appearance of commitment , must lie behind the threat and be successfully communicated to the threatened party is in contradiction to an- other notion that often appears in game theory ...
Page 247
... fact be conveyed in a believable way in time to prevent the other side's mistaken decision . MISAPPREHENSION OF ... fact we were not but they thought we might be ? How might they prove to us that they were not initiating a surprise ...
... fact be conveyed in a believable way in time to prevent the other side's mistaken decision . MISAPPREHENSION OF ... fact we were not but they thought we might be ? How might they prove to us that they were not initiating a surprise ...
Page 284
... fact that even in the realm of mathematics there are offhand too many types of uniqueness or symmetry to provide an unam- biguous rule for selection , hence a need to adduce plausible criteria ( axioms ) sufficient to yield an ...
... fact that even in the realm of mathematics there are offhand too many types of uniqueness or symmetry to provide an unam- biguous rule for selection , hence a need to adduce plausible criteria ( axioms ) sufficient to yield an ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game