The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 217
... Final Written Offer . ( a ) Content of Final Written Offer . The final written offer shal ! contain : 1. A final offering price , which shall be approved by the Department , together with a statement that such price has been approved by ...
... Final Written Offer . ( a ) Content of Final Written Offer . The final written offer shal ! contain : 1. A final offering price , which shall be approved by the Department , together with a statement that such price has been approved by ...
Page 675
... final ord . 451 -sewer cleaning , reassessment , first ord . , 543 ; final ord . -assessment roll , certified , 611 ; con- firmed -sewer , first ord . , 129 ; final ord . SELYE TERRACE- -tree planting , first ord . , 528 ; ord . fina ...
... final ord . 451 -sewer cleaning , reassessment , first ord . , 543 ; final ord . -assessment roll , certified , 611 ; con- firmed -sewer , first ord . , 129 ; final ord . SELYE TERRACE- -tree planting , first ord . , 528 ; ord . fina ...
Page 199
... Final effluent Crude sewage. SAMPLE . DESCRIPTION OF THE " Gas " in Gelatine " Shake " Cultures ( 24 hours at 20 ° C ... Final effluent 12th March 1900 . Final effluent 14th March 1900 . Final effluent 19th March 1900 . General effluent ...
... Final effluent Crude sewage. SAMPLE . DESCRIPTION OF THE " Gas " in Gelatine " Shake " Cultures ( 24 hours at 20 ° C ... Final effluent 12th March 1900 . Final effluent 14th March 1900 . Final effluent 19th March 1900 . General effluent ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game