The Strategy of Conflict
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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The Formosan Straits made it possible to stabilize a line between the Communist
and National government forces of China, not solely because water favored the
defender and inhibited attack, but because an island is an integral unit and water
The special significance of surprise attack thus lies in the pos! sible vulnerability
of retaliatory forces. If these forces were them* Selves invulnerable—if each side
were confident that its own forces could survive an attack, but also that it could ...
If restrictions on the deployment of forces are used to make the task of inspection
more manageable, something may be accomplished. But though there may be
promise in the idea of combining inspection and weapon limitations, there are ...
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY
Game Theory and Experimental Research
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