The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 17
... irrationality . " Hitler , the French Parliament , the com- mander of a bomber , the radar operators at Pearl Harbor , Khrushchev , and the ... irrational . ” J ― - The second observation is related to the first INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY 17.
... irrationality . " Hitler , the French Parliament , the com- mander of a bomber , the radar operators at Pearl Harbor , Khrushchev , and the ... irrational . ” J ― - The second observation is related to the first INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY 17.
Page 212
... irrational " attack on both sides , is not an en- largement of those probabilities by the fear of surprise attack ; it is either joint attack or no attack . That is , it is a pair of decisions , not a pair of probabilities about ...
... irrational " attack on both sides , is not an en- largement of those probabilities by the fear of surprise attack ; it is either joint attack or no attack . That is , it is a pair of decisions , not a pair of probabilities about ...
Page 217
... irrational attack at each move , the outcome depends on whether P. = 1 − ( 1 − P. ) " and P1 = ( 1 - P , ) - 1 meet the conditions derived earlier . If so , each player knows that the other will not subsequently choose to attack , and ...
... irrational attack at each move , the outcome depends on whether P. = 1 − ( 1 − P. ) " and P1 = ( 1 - P , ) - 1 meet the conditions derived earlier . If so , each player knows that the other will not subsequently choose to attack , and ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game