The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 201
... keep the enemy guessing as long as we are not trying to keep him guessing about our own motivation . If the outcome is partly determined by events and processes that are manifestly somewhat beyond our comprehen- sion and control , we ...
... keep the enemy guessing as long as we are not trying to keep him guessing about our own motivation . If the outcome is partly determined by events and processes that are manifestly somewhat beyond our comprehen- sion and control , we ...
Page 245
... keep it up ? Suppose we cannot physically keep all aircraft in the air at all times , as is true , and that it may be too costly in all respects ( accidents as well as fuel and crews ) to keep as many as half of them in the sky on the ...
... keep it up ? Suppose we cannot physically keep all aircraft in the air at all times , as is true , and that it may be too costly in all respects ( accidents as well as fuel and crews ) to keep as many as half of them in the sky on the ...
Page 269
... keeps ( or may keep ) his current " official " offer recorded in some manner that will be visible to the referee when the bell rings . Perhaps he keeps it written on a blackboard that the other player can see ; perhaps he keeps it in a ...
... keeps ( or may keep ) his current " official " offer recorded in some manner that will be visible to the referee when the bell rings . Perhaps he keeps it written on a blackboard that the other player can see ; perhaps he keeps it in a ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game