The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 23
... knows everything about the other , and each knows what the other knows . What is there to fool about ? The buyer may say that , though he'd really pay up to twenty and the seller knows it , he is firmly resolved as a tacti- cal matter ...
... knows everything about the other , and each knows what the other knows . What is there to fool about ? The buyer may say that , though he'd really pay up to twenty and the seller knows it , he is firmly resolved as a tacti- cal matter ...
Page 115
... knows the " true " payoff matrix of the other is often to make an extraordinary assumption about the institu- tional ... know how badly the Russians would dislike an all - out war in which both sides were annihilated ? We cannot ; and ...
... knows the " true " payoff matrix of the other is often to make an extraordinary assumption about the institu- tional ... know how badly the Russians would dislike an all - out war in which both sides were annihilated ? We cannot ; and ...
Page 217
... knows what C will elect , and makes a predictable choice that depends on Pe . At the preceding move , C knows what R will choose , takes P , into account and makes a predictable choice . At the move before that , R knows what C will ...
... knows what C will elect , and makes a predictable choice that depends on Pe . At the preceding move , C knows what R will choose , takes P , into account and makes a predictable choice . At the move before that , R knows what C will ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game