The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 72
... less symmetrical or the river less unique or A B C a less natural order for those letters . If all we had to reason from were the logic of tacit bargaining , it would be only a guess and perhaps a wild one that the same kind of psychic ...
... less symmetrical or the river less unique or A B C a less natural order for those letters . If all we had to reason from were the logic of tacit bargaining , it would be only a guess and perhaps a wild one that the same kind of psychic ...
Page 193
... less likely it is that the enemy's aggressive advances can be contained by limited and local resistance , the more reason there may be to fall back upon the deliberate creation of mutual risk . ( Alternatively , the more the aggressor ...
... less likely it is that the enemy's aggressive advances can be contained by limited and local resistance , the more reason there may be to fall back upon the deliberate creation of mutual risk . ( Alternatively , the more the aggressor ...
Page 197
... less than certain that the box will explode on any given day . In ordinary deterrence- where nothing happens unless ... less risky , the more automatic the mechanism is ; the more automatic it is , the less incentive the enemy has to ...
... less than certain that the box will explode on any given day . In ordinary deterrence- where nothing happens unless ... less risky , the more automatic the mechanism is ; the more automatic it is , the less incentive the enemy has to ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game