The Strategy of Conflict
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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If he behaves “rationally” as defined in our behavior hypothesis above, he must
consider the likelihood that I will shoot him out of sheer preference; and he must
consider that I may shoot him if I think there is a strong likelihood that he will
nervousness enhances the likelihood that I may shoot him even though I prefer
not to. He sees my nervousness and gets nervous himself; that scares me more,
and I am even more likely to shoot. He sees this increment in my nervousness, ...
But now we can have a model of a rational decider who responds to an estimate
of the probability of being attacked not by an overt decision to act or abstain, but
by adjusting the likelihood that he may mistakenly attack. One's response to an ...
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY
Game Theory and Experimental Research
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