The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 92
... matter of convergent expectations - everyone's expectation of what everyone expects of everyone with the new arrivals ' expectations being molded in time to help mold the expectations of subsequent arrivals . There is a sense of ...
... matter of convergent expectations - everyone's expectation of what everyone expects of everyone with the new arrivals ' expectations being molded in time to help mold the expectations of subsequent arrivals . There is a sense of ...
Page 106
... matter who played the game pre- viously and how it came out . ( If it did matter , one of the players would be motivated to destroy the influence of these details ; and a minimax strategy , randomized if necessary , would destroy it ...
... matter who played the game pre- viously and how it came out . ( If it did matter , one of the players would be motivated to destroy the influence of these details ; and a minimax strategy , randomized if necessary , would destroy it ...
Page 152
... matter what ; he could pick ii no matter what ; he could play i to column I and ii to column II ; or he could play ii to column I and i to column II . Including the possibility of commitment , he now has first the choice of commit- ting ...
... matter what ; he could pick ii no matter what ; he could play i to column I and ii to column II ; or he could play ii to column I and i to column II . Including the possibility of commitment , he now has first the choice of commit- ting ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game