The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 29
Page 54
... meet if they get separated , the chances are good that they will find each other . It is likely that each will think of some obvious place to meet , so obvious that each will be sure that the other is sure that it is " obvious ” to both ...
... meet if they get separated , the chances are good that they will find each other . It is likely that each will think of some obvious place to meet , so obvious that each will be sure that the other is sure that it is " obvious ” to both ...
Page 56
... meet somebody in New York City . You have not been instructed where to meet ; you have no prior under- standing with the person on where to meet ; and you cannot com- municate with each other . You are simply told that you will have to ...
... meet somebody in New York City . You have not been instructed where to meet ; you have no prior under- standing with the person on where to meet ; and you cannot com- municate with each other . You are simply told that you will have to ...
Page 58
... meet each other ; but only one versed in mathematics would " naturally " expect to meet his partner at the center of gravity of an irregularly shaped area . Equally essential is some kind of uniqueness ; the man and his wife cannot meet ...
... meet each other ; but only one versed in mathematics would " naturally " expect to meet his partner at the center of gravity of an irregularly shaped area . Equally essential is some kind of uniqueness ; the man and his wife cannot meet ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
11 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game