The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 99
... motive game ( In Appendix C it is argued that certain solution concepts familiar in game theory can be given an interpretation in terms of the coordination concept . ) SUGGESTION AND MUTUAL PERCEPTION IN THE MIXED - MOTIVE GAME ...
... motive game ( In Appendix C it is argued that certain solution concepts familiar in game theory can be given an interpretation in terms of the coordination concept . ) SUGGESTION AND MUTUAL PERCEPTION IN THE MIXED - MOTIVE GAME ...
Page 207
... motive for striking , and so justifies the other's motive . But , if the gains from even successful surprise are less desired than no war at all , there is no " fundamental " basis for an attack by either side . Nevertheless , it looks ...
... motive for striking , and so justifies the other's motive . But , if the gains from even successful surprise are less desired than no war at all , there is no " fundamental " basis for an attack by either side . Nevertheless , it looks ...
Page 298
... motives for choosing it , even if only to make sure that the concept is operational . As between the two motives mentioned the " insurance " motive and the " coordination - clue " motive- we might distinguish as follows . We offer a ...
... motives for choosing it , even if only to make sure that the concept is operational . As between the two motives mentioned the " insurance " motive and the " coordination - clue " motive- we might distinguish as follows . We offer a ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game