## The Strategy of ConflictA series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages. |

### From inside the book

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Page 124

The commitment is a means of gaining first

carries an advantage; the threat is a commitment to a strategy for second

threat can therefore be effective only if the game is one in which the first

The commitment is a means of gaining first

**move**in a game in which first**move**carries an advantage; the threat is a commitment to a strategy for second

**move**. Athreat can therefore be effective only if the game is one in which the first

**move**is ...Page 125

(If second

were as good, one needs only an unconditional commitment to his strategy

choice, not a commitment to a conditional choice.) But if this preference order

holds for ...

(If second

**move**alone is as good, the threat is unnecessary; and if first**move**were as good, one needs only an unconditional commitment to his strategy

choice, not a commitment to a conditional choice.) But if this preference order

holds for ...

Page 156

This seems to be the general form of solution in the enlarged tacit game that

corresponds to a sequential-

of first calculating the rational last

...

This seems to be the general form of solution in the enlarged tacit game that

corresponds to a sequential-

**move**game ... actually be identified with the processof first calculating the rational last

**move**for all possible sets of prior**moves**, then,...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY | 81 |

Moves | 119 |

Game Theory and Experimental Research | 162 |

Copyright | |

7 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage agree agreement alternative assume attack bargaining become behavior better carry chance Chapter choice choose Column commitment communication concert consider cooperative coordination cost course decision depends deterrence effect enemy enforcement evidence example expectations fact final forces gain game theory give identify important incentive initial interest involved keep kind knows least leave less limited mathematical matrix matter means meet move mutual negotiation nuclear objective offer one's original other's outcome particular party payoff perhaps person play players position possible potential preference present principle probability problem promise pure question random rational reach reason recognize reduce requires retaliation risk role rules Russians seems sense side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise symmetry tacit tactic theory third threat threaten tion weapons yield