The Strategy of Conflict
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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The commitment is a means of gaining first move in a game in which first move
carries an advantage; the threat is a commitment to a strategy for second move. A
threat can therefore be effective only if the game is one in which the first move is ...
(If second move alone is as good, the threat is unnecessary; and if first move
were as good, one needs only an unconditional commitment to his strategy
choice, not a commitment to a conditional choice.) But if this preference order
holds for ...
This seems to be the general form of solution in the enlarged tacit game that
corresponds to a sequential-move game ... actually be identified with the process
of first calculating the rational last move for all possible sets of prior moves, then,
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY
Game Theory and Experimental Research
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