The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 124
... move in a game in which first move carries an advantage ; the threat is a commitment to a strategy for second move . A threat can therefore be effective only if the game is one in which the first move is up to the other player or one ...
... move in a game in which first move carries an advantage ; the threat is a commitment to a strategy for second move . A threat can therefore be effective only if the game is one in which the first move is up to the other player or one ...
Page 125
... move . It is profitable only if it yields a better payoff than either first move or second move alone and when one can make the other player move first either actually or by promise . ( If second move alone is as good , the threat is ...
... move . It is profitable only if it yields a better payoff than either first move or second move alone and when one can make the other player move first either actually or by promise . ( If second move alone is as good , the threat is ...
Page 156
... move game when the latter has a deter- minate solution . The discarding of rows and columns can actually be identified with the process of first calculating the rational last move for all possible sets of prior moves , then , knowing ...
... move game when the latter has a deter- minate solution . The discarding of rows and columns can actually be identified with the process of first calculating the rational last move for all possible sets of prior moves , then , knowing ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game