The Strategy of Conflict
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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and this may be done by bargaining, by mutual accommodation, and by the
avoidance of mutually damaging behavior. If war to the finish has become
inevitable, there is nothing left but pure conflict; but if there is any possibility of
avoiding a ...
But on the strategy of action where conflict is mixed with mutual dependence —
the nonzero-sum games involved in wars and threats of war, strikes, negotiations,
criminal deterrence, class war, race war, price war, and blackmail; maneuvering ...
... has no recourse — that the other player will rationally expect him to submit to
the discipline of the suggestions that emanate from the game's concrete details
and will take actions that, on pain of mutual damage, assume he will co-operate.
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY
Game Theory and Experimental Research
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