The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 257
... nuclear weapons suitable for local use by ground troops with modest equipment , and with the development of nuclear depth charges and nuclear rockets for air - to - air combat , the technical characteristics of nuclear weapons have ...
... nuclear weapons suitable for local use by ground troops with modest equipment , and with the development of nuclear depth charges and nuclear rockets for air - to - air combat , the technical characteristics of nuclear weapons have ...
Page 264
... nuclear weapons . In the interest of limiting war , we should want the Russians or the Chinese not to believe that our initial use of atomic weapons in a local war were a challenge to the whole idea of limitations , a declaration that ...
... nuclear weapons . In the interest of limiting war , we should want the Russians or the Chinese not to believe that our initial use of atomic weapons in a local war were a challenge to the whole idea of limitations , a declaration that ...
Page 265
... nuclear weapons are different would be as powerfully present on the oc- casion of the next limited war after they had already been used in one . We can probably not , therefore , ignore the distinction and use nuclears in a particular ...
... nuclear weapons are different would be as powerfully present on the oc- casion of the next limited war after they had already been used in one . We can probably not , therefore , ignore the distinction and use nuclears in a particular ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game