The Strategy of Conflict
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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APPENDIX A NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LIMITED WAR * With the development
of small-size, small-yield nuclear weapons Suitable for local use by ground
troops with modest equipment, and with the development of nuclear depth
It has to do with whether the Russians think we share with them a tacit
expectation that there is a limit against the use of nuclear weapons. In the interest
of limiting war, we should want the Russians or the Chinese not to believe that
our initial ...
It is difficult to imagine that the tacit agreement that nuclear weapons are different
would be as powerfully present on the occasion of the next limited war after they
had already been used in one. We can probably not, therefore, ignore the ...
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY
Game Theory and Experimental Research
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