The Strategy of Conflict
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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guess what another will do in an objective situation; one is trying to guess what
the other will guess one's self to guess the other to guess, and so on ad infinitum.
(“Meeting” someone in the personal column of a newspaper is a good example.
In the pure-coordination game, the player's objective is to make contact with the
other player through some imaginative process of introspection, of searching for
shared clues; in the minimax strategy of a zero-sum game — most strikingly so ...
Furthermore, some seemingly desirable agreements must be left out for being
undefinable operationally; agreements not to discriminate against each other will
work only if defined in objective terms capable of objective supervision. Promises
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY
Game Theory and Experimental Research
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