The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 143
... original Row- player a payoff of 5 as a by - product . ( If the third party's rewards had to be financed by Row , whose own payoffs were correspond- ingly reduced , it would still be worth his while to make an ir- revocable assignment ...
... original Row- player a payoff of 5 as a by - product . ( If the third party's rewards had to be financed by Row , whose own payoffs were correspond- ingly reduced , it would still be worth his while to make an ir- revocable assignment ...
Page 152
... original game , such as those in Fig . 15 A , but also the strategies of commit , threaten , promise , and so forth ? Certainly , once we have specified what moves are available and the order in which they are to be taken . Take the ...
... original game , such as those in Fig . 15 A , but also the strategies of commit , threaten , promise , and so forth ? Certainly , once we have specified what moves are available and the order in which they are to be taken . Take the ...
Page 154
... original game ? And , if so , how does it show up in the enlarged matrix ? The original game clearly has a solution for rational players . ( A ) If Row is committed to row i , with a penalty of 5 for breaking his com- mitment , Column ...
... original game ? And , if so , how does it show up in the enlarged matrix ? The original game clearly has a solution for rational players . ( A ) If Row is committed to row i , with a penalty of 5 for breaking his com- mitment , Column ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game