The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 45
... other's prudence ( or the other's confidence in the first's prudence , and so forth ) on a large issue . But , if a number of preparatory bar- gains can be struck on a small scale , each may be willing to risk a small investment to ...
... other's prudence ( or the other's confidence in the first's prudence , and so forth ) on a large issue . But , if a number of preparatory bar- gains can be struck on a small scale , each may be willing to risk a small investment to ...
Page 226
... other has adjusted the values of R and B. That is , each understands the mechanics of the other's warning system , but can never be sure just what instructions the other has given on how to interpret the evidence that comes in over the ...
... other has adjusted the values of R and B. That is , each understands the mechanics of the other's warning system , but can never be sure just what instructions the other has given on how to interpret the evidence that comes in over the ...
Page 274
... other player before the expiration of the minute , the game is essentially the same as before ; " simultaneous " now means within a minute of each other for practical purposes , and again neither can see the other's final offer as he ...
... other player before the expiration of the minute , the game is essentially the same as before ; " simultaneous " now means within a minute of each other for practical purposes , and again neither can see the other's final offer as he ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game