The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 92
... particular role , or by another's role , because it is the only role that in the circumstances can be identified by a process of tacit consent . - A good example might be the esprit de corps ( or lack of it ) of an army unit or naval ...
... particular role , or by another's role , because it is the only role that in the circumstances can be identified by a process of tacit consent . - A good example might be the esprit de corps ( or lack of it ) of an army unit or naval ...
Page 113
... particular simultaneous action among the group , like a mass protest , is often a means of " ratifying " the existence of the coali- tion and of demonstrating that everybody expects everybody else to act in concert . But even in a two ...
... particular simultaneous action among the group , like a mass protest , is often a means of " ratifying " the existence of the coali- tion and of demonstrating that everybody expects everybody else to act in concert . But even in a two ...
Page 170
... particular encounters become invested with symbolic importance , such that each player recognizes that he is establishing a role and reputation in the way he conducts him- self at a particular point in the game . Another dimension of ...
... particular encounters become invested with symbolic importance , such that each player recognizes that he is establishing a role and reputation in the way he conducts him- self at a particular point in the game . Another dimension of ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game