The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 36
... person . One may even stake his reputation with the threatened person himself , on grounds that it would be worth the costs and pains to give a lesson to the latter if he fails to heed the threat . Or one may try to arrange a legal ...
... person . One may even stake his reputation with the threatened person himself , on grounds that it would be worth the costs and pains to give a lesson to the latter if he fails to heed the threat . Or one may try to arrange a legal ...
Page 38
... person to be threatened is already committed , the one who would threaten cannot deter with his threat , he can only make certain the mutually disastrous consequences that he threatens.10 If the person to be threatened can arrange ...
... person to be threatened is already committed , the one who would threaten cannot deter with his threat , he can only make certain the mutually disastrous consequences that he threatens.10 If the person to be threatened can arrange ...
Page 169
... person's choice was not confirmed , they tended to interpret his choice as being a function of indifference or a basic lack of understanding as to how the game ' should ' be played . . . . In this group , knowledge of the other person's ...
... person's choice was not confirmed , they tended to interpret his choice as being a function of indifference or a basic lack of understanding as to how the game ' should ' be played . . . . In this group , knowledge of the other person's ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game