The Strategy of Conflict
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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5 and 6 show two games that separately contain nothing of interest but together
make possible an extortionate threat. ... at a B; either can achieve a B, neither can
enforce anything better, no collaboration is possible, no threat can be made.
fining the limits to war and in making geographical limits possible. The area was
surrounded by water, and the principal northern political boundary was marked
dramatically and unmistakably by a river. The thirty-eighth parallel seems to have
Column has eight possible strategy combinations: for each of three contingencies
he has either of two moves, the moves being I and II, the contingencies being
Row's commitment to i, Row's commitment to ii, and Row's noncommitment.
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY
Game Theory and Experimental Research
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