The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 9
... potential force . It is concerned with persuading a potential enemy that he should in his own interest avoid certain courses of activity . There is an im- portant difference between the intellectual skills required for carrying out a ...
... potential force . It is concerned with persuading a potential enemy that he should in his own interest avoid certain courses of activity . There is an im- portant difference between the intellectual skills required for carrying out a ...
Page 12
... potential outcome , given the array of alternatives available to both parties , they have a " common interest " in the sense intended in the text . " Potential common interest " might seem more descriptive . Deterrence , for example ...
... potential outcome , given the array of alternatives available to both parties , they have a " common interest " in the sense intended in the text . " Potential common interest " might seem more descriptive . Deterrence , for example ...
Page 15
... potential enemies and its applicability to potential friends . The theory degenerates at one extreme if there is no scope for mutual accommodation , no common interest at all even in avoiding mu- tual disaster ; it degenerates at the ...
... potential enemies and its applicability to potential friends . The theory degenerates at one extreme if there is no scope for mutual accommodation , no common interest at all even in avoiding mu- tual disaster ; it degenerates at the ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game