The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 66
... preference and could not even do him a favor or make a " fair " compromise if you wished to , the only basis for concerting is to see what message you can both read in your schedule . Your own preferred letter seems the indi- cated ...
... preference and could not even do him a favor or make a " fair " compromise if you wished to , the only basis for concerting is to see what message you can both read in your schedule . Your own preferred letter seems the indi- cated ...
Page 84
... preference scales . ( And , to avoid any initial conflict , it has to be evident to the players that the preferences are identical , so that there is no conflict of interest in the information or misinformation that they try to convey ...
... preference scales . ( And , to avoid any initial conflict , it has to be evident to the players that the preferences are identical , so that there is no conflict of interest in the information or misinformation that they try to convey ...
Page 218
... preference ; and he must consider that I may shoot him if I think there is a strong likelihood that he will shoot me out of sheer preference . But , if we both know what these two basic ( exogenous ) " likelihoods " are , we need not go ...
... preference ; and he must consider that I may shoot him if I think there is a strong likelihood that he will shoot me out of sheer preference . But , if we both know what these two basic ( exogenous ) " likelihoods " are , we need not go ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game