The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 14
... present , who has access to or control of the communication system , whose behavior is rational or irrational in one sense or another , who enjoys trust or some means of contract enforce- ment with one or another of the two principals ...
... present , who has access to or control of the communication system , whose behavior is rational or irrational in one sense or another , who enjoys trust or some means of contract enforce- ment with one or another of the two principals ...
Page 271
... presents a model that is explicitly tacit in its final stage . The model's relation to the cooperative game was heuristic ... present paper is that the relation is likely to be mechanical rather than intellectual if a symmetrical move ...
... presents a model that is explicitly tacit in its final stage . The model's relation to the cooperative game was heuristic ... present paper is that the relation is likely to be mechanical rather than intellectual if a symmetrical move ...
Page 281
... present purpose we must suppose that two players have picked $ 80 and $ 20 by agreement and see whether we can identify any kind of intellectual error , misguided expectations , or disorderly self - interest , on the part of one or both ...
... present purpose we must suppose that two players have picked $ 80 and $ 20 by agreement and see whether we can identify any kind of intellectual error , misguided expectations , or disorderly self - interest , on the part of one or both ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game