The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 132
... Promises are generally thought of as bilateral ( contractual ) commitments , given against a quid pro quo that is often a prom- ise in return . But there is incentive for a unilateral promise when it provides inducement to the other ...
... Promises are generally thought of as bilateral ( contractual ) commitments , given against a quid pro quo that is often a prom- ise in return . But there is incentive for a unilateral promise when it provides inducement to the other ...
Page 133
... promise ; he threatens ii against I and promises i in the event of II . The promise insures Column a payoff of 4 rather than zero , once he has made a choice of II , and in that sense it is favorable to him ; it does so at a cost of I ...
... promise ; he threatens ii against I and promises i in the event of II . The promise insures Column a payoff of 4 rather than zero , once he has made a choice of II , and in that sense it is favorable to him ; it does so at a cost of I ...
Page 134
... promise im- munity to those that come forward.12 A better definition , perhaps , would make the promise a com- mitment that is controlled by the second party , that is , a commit- ment that the second party can enforce or release as he ...
... promise im- munity to those that come forward.12 A better definition , perhaps , would make the promise a com- mitment that is controlled by the second party , that is , a commit- ment that the second party can enforce or release as he ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game